Paul Dennis Sporer / Writings / Articles

Preserving Traditional Marriage
by Paul Dennis Sporer

It should surprise no one that traditionally the peasantry of Southwest Germany were very different in social structure and lifestyle from the nobility of that same region. However, what is intriguing is that the families of the two classes had similar, albeit more consistent, long-term reactions to economic forces. For example, the issue of inheritance was guided by the same parsimonious worldview. The evidence shows that the nobility did not divide estates among offspring during economic downturns mainly to preserve their prestigious way of life, and as a result, hardly half of the sons and daughters born in the 15th century married. Most of the unmarried sons, and nearly all the unmarried daughters entered the Church, this being especially true for lower-ranking noble families. Higher-ranking families placed sons in military careers. This pattern was similar in other Catholic parts of Europe: Florence before 1700, Milan before 1750, Toulouse before 1760; of 17th century French dukes and peers, half the sons and half the daughters did not marry. When Protestantism became the established religion in various regions, daughters were more likely to marry, since there were no convents in which to conveniently place them. Still, the older ways persisted in some areas, such as the Protestant part of Geneva, where a quarter of sons and daughters did not marry.
Thus, the reason why land was not divided among heirs rests primarily upon economics. In general, the eldest son did not necessarily inherit, and although there is a long-standing tradition for all brothers to inherit, this was done only when economic circumstances allowed. In the 15th century, during a period of agricultural depression and fewer options in secular careers, land division was avoided and more of the nobility's offspring entered the ranks of the Church. Conversely, the period of the 16th century and the early 17th century brought forth an expanding economy in agriculture and better occupational opportunities, with a concomitant policy amongst the nobility of subdividing estates. In this situation, fewer children remained unmarried and fewer entered the clergy. By the late 17th century, noblemen again refrained from dividing estates, a tendency that was an outgrowth of the effect of the Thirty Years' War on grain and land prices, as well as on tenant income. Again, a larger proportion of children remained unmarried, although this effect was more pronounced for females and in general was not nearly at the levels seen in the period before the 16th century. In spite of dour financial circumstances, the more favourable marital outcome occurred as a result of men being able to engage in alternate occupations and make honourable lives for themselves.

Economic and demographic upheavals leave deep marks on a culture, which revises its outlook and priorities according to the realities at hand. One does not quite know why Germans coined proverbs such as 'he who marries does well, but he who does not marry does better', or 'marriage is both heaven and hell'. They had a suspect view of marriage, but without the aspersions, or even misogyny of some other European cultures. The negative experiences of Germany in the Thirty Years War and its growing pains as a nation might have reflected adversely on many households. The unfortunate dispute between the social ideal of equanimity (all brothers inheriting) and of economic reality (only the eldest inherited in difficult times) made many cast a stern eye on marriage perhaps as psychological protection against the heartbreak of not being in a position to inherit. Marriage denied to a man or woman who was never attracted to it in the first place is no great hardship.

We see that people in every country and situation had a definite idea of the 'proper' standard of living, and they could not easily envision a viable marriage that did not attain it. Although the private, innermost thoughts and attitudes of people on the matters we have covered have not been preserved, some indicators that illuminate actual thought processes are available.

One such source of evidence is the proceedings of marriage courts, which contain the views of ordinary people and persons in authority on the issue of courtship, marriage and family relationships. We see, for example, that in Neuchatel, a parish in Switzerland, cases where one party wished to annul a marriage were brought before a special court. In the period before the 1700s, promises of marriage were binding if made by persons at the age 20 or older and in front of two or more witnesses. The marriage contract and the agreement to marry were allowed to stand; whether the couple claimed to 'love' each other was not a pertinent concern. Interestingly, after 1700, the emphasis moved from a strict application of vows to a more flexible approach involving emotional and psychological compatibility. All of the parties concerned had to be assured that the couple really wanted to live with each other; even if promises were made, they were not considered binding unless the woman was pregnant, in which case the interests of the child overrode the interests of the parents.

The justices perceived that, since vows of marriage were colloquially considered the beginning of marriage, men and women felt that sexual intercourse would not be a sin. Because of this, premarital pregnancy became an increasingly disconcerting theme in Europe. For example, for premarital pregnancies, Germany on average experienced a rise of from 13% to 24%, France from 6% to 13%, England from 20% to 35%. In the 'old days', it was assumed that couples would not promise marriage without being serious, but in the modern period, many such promises were suspected of being totally insincere. This meant many men abandoned their prospective wives, resulting in increased illegitimacy. Further, even if the marriage took place, the couple might not get along, since they were never in love to begin with. These factors led to the necessity of a courtroom 'test' of compatibility.

Thus, the authorities sought to avoid the more serious peril of divorce and separation due to forcing two people into marriage completely unsuited to each other. Ironically, by allowing men and women the opportunity to make non-binding promises of marriage, and so increase the chance of premarital sex, not only did they set the stage for premarital pregnancy, but also created a situation of devaluing intimate male-female relationships. Forcing marriage on those who made promises would have undoubtedly led to a relatively small number of broken households, but the respect for the institution and for intimacy would have remained.

Persons in authority, charged with safeguarding not only traditions but the family, realised that people were becoming less serious and cautious in contracting a marriage, and they wanted to be as certain as possible that married life would remain viable. The same frivolity that attended the decision to marry also attended behaviours coincident with the relationship, which included premarital sex. It seems, however, that officials understood the changing morality, as intervention somewhat preceded the social change in fertility and sexual attitudes. Perhaps it would have been better to remain inflexible in marriage contracts as a warning not to enter engagement without giving careful thought to the feasibility of the relationship. Objectively speaking, the traditional structures of marriage should have been preserved, as they functioned quite well in attaining a balance between the needs of couples and the needs of the community.

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