|
Inequity in Society Delays Marriage
by Paul Dennis Spörer
Let us look in detail at the reasons that specifically made it difficult for people to act freely. As we do not have any objective indicator of the willingness to marry, we must extract whatever information we can from the indicators that we do have. In research on the marital practises of the past, the emphasis is usually on two dependent variables: average age of marriage and celibacy rates. Age of marriage and celibacy rates are widely available, going back to at least the 17th century. These figures, in association with other social and economic statistics, can enlighten us as to what individuals thought of marriage.
The current model of marriage practises in the pre-modern period stems in part from the work of John Hajnal, beginning a debate in 1965, (1) which, in the years since, has forced this original model to be modified. (2) Building his theory on Malthusian ideas, he asserted that there is a zone of low nuptiality in Europe, northwest of a line drawn from Trieste, Italy to Leningrad (now St Petersburg), Russia. He believed that this division, which arose between the 16th and 17th centuries, was based on a tradition that required a newly married couple to form a separate independent household. The performance of the economy was a critical factor in determining the age of marriage, and the basis for a household, and in one sense for 'love', was financial. Europeans had become inured to achieving a certain lifestyle and were reluctant to fall below that standard; indeed, they wanted to progress to a higher level than the previous generation. People believed, paradoxically, in an 'American dream' long before there was an America.
'Low nuptiality' is a way of saying permanent celibacy and historical surveys show the persistent and widespread, though not constant, occurrence of celibacy throughout Europe. Because of this diversity of marriage patterns, scholars have been unable to cite some overriding cultural factor to explain low nuptiality. Instead, the economic situation, with similar diversity of local situations superimposed on regional and international trends, is often implicated in the propensity to marry. Economic developments affect occupations and living standards, which in turn affects the need and desire for marriage. For women, marriage conflicted with employment as a servant; for men, a greater involvement with their occupation, such as working long hours, travelling, and socialising, etiolated relations with women. Moreover, demographic factors are often a factor in keeping people from marriage; the cities provided diversions and entertainment for many people, whilst offering better living conditions and alternative family structures for many men and women of the lower classes. We can see these situations in an analysis of death records for a parish in Warsaw, Poland for the period of 1760 to 1801. (3) The percent who remained single until death increased during this period. For men, the percent single increased from about 8% to 24%; for women, the figures are more erratic, but rising from about 4% to 11%. These are high figures by our Western standards, especially for men.
Census records give us a similar picture that shows even higher rates of celibacy. However, the city was in the past a fairly volatile demographic entity and we should be careful in assessing census records as these point to a particular point in time. People can temporarily immigrate and reside, which might significantly change the balance of single to married. A 1791 census of the same parish found that about 22% of men and women over age 50 were single. However, this includes large numbers of tradesmen, senators, servants and so on who had come on the occasion of the debates in the Great Parliament held in 1788 to 1792. The death record analysis is somewhat more accurate in assessing proportions, and this underlines the difficulties inherent in obtaining accurate celibacy rates. In addition, other local conditions were in effect that might make the rates for one city very different from other similar sized cities. The rates for women in this parish resemble that of smaller towns in Western Europe, as higher proportions of women living in the larger towns and cities were permanently celibate. (4) Whatever social and economic factors could account for this are not clear, but it is intriguing to see the evidence of cultural segmentation emerge in the differences between urbanite and peasant at such an early stage in the 'miraculous' development of the Western world. What is even more interesting is that the first sign of this miracle is revealed in the domestic domain, where the demands of a complex economy, migration, and standard of living affected marriage age and married life.
Hence, economic conditions had a major role in facilitating or hindering marriage throughout early modern Europe. But conditions at home, especially when they interact with economic factors, contribute significant aspects to the concept of independence, which in turn has its own effects on marriage. We start by looking at nineteenth century Spain, as examined in Reher (1991), which exhibits practises and principles that were fairly typical and widespread across Europe in the pre-Industrial period. The main themes of traditional periods were elaborated in real terms; dependence on inheritance money, occupational limitations on female servants, marriage market inequalities, and opportunity effects through death were all priorities, and in that order. In general, these factors held better for females, and for celibacy rather than age of marriage. Male and female celibacy rates were geographically coincident, ranging from about 3% in the central portions, to highs of 15% and more in the northern coastal region, parts of the eastern coast, and the south. Inheritance practises also coincided with the propensity to marry: the more impartible the inheritance practise, the later the marriage age, and the greater percent who remain celibate. Unable to obtain the funds for married life, many had little choice but to remain celibate, either living with their families, with non-related housemates, or in a domestic service situation. In the last case, it is not surprising that the more girls who worked as servants, the later the marriage and more celibacy. As marriage between servants was often not possible, a person in such an occupation was limited in this regard relative to other occupations. Moreover, the lower the male-female ratio (marriage market), i.e. fewer males per females, the lower female nuptiality. Out-migration, from the region to other areas, resulted in many women being left without a match. There is a small but significant interaction between impartible inheritance and sex ratio, indicating men left the area if they could not inherit, a situation which created an imbalance in the sex-ratio.
Economic factors were also responsible to a large extent for the changes in the last theme mentioned above, that of mortality. Poor work conditions and high population density in cities were undoubtedly responsible for many unnecessary deaths. Thus, the toll that the new modern economy exacted on health and well-being must have dampened enthusiasm for life and love. Bearing this mind, it is puzzling, however, why people in Spain were more likely to marry if the incidence of mortality was higher. Clearly, something overrode the emotional reaction to social disruption. Possibly seeing an opportunity to marry when a husband or wife died, an individual could in this way raise his status and his financial position. A man might never have married, had not another man died and made 'available' his wife. However, this relationship between death rates and nuptiality might not entirely be based on personal financial considerations, but might be affected by an ethos of population control. Society has always been understandably sensitive to changes in its size and has found ways to control it. Before the use of artificial contraception, the only reliable way to control fertility was through marriage practise. Indeed, '[t]he classic regulatory mechanism among west European populations of the early modern period was marriage'. (5) The special demands of larger society were not lost on most individuals, as the economic welfare of the individual was consciously tied to the welfare of the whole society. When death rates declined, the annual increase in the population would be higher and the only way to stop the population from reaching unmanageable levels was by delaying marriage.
The evidence shows that mortality was connected to celibacy rates in early modern Europe, for we see that in the 18th century that an improvement in death rates was met by a delay in and abandonment of marriage. In the period from 1700 to 1880, the celibacy rate in France rose steadily and peaked for women at nearly 15% in 1820, and for men at around 10% in 1840. For women the low in 1700 was about 5%, and in 1880, it was 11%; for men the figures were respectively 5% and 8%. These changes could be attributed to a form of population control, lowering births through celibacy and late marriage to compensate for lower mortality. Thus, measures such as these served effectively to stabilise the population and the economy. Population growth was managed through various mechanisms as a way of avoiding overuse of resources including land, the most important of which was delaying marriage as a way of reducing the number of births per woman.
Thus, changes in marriage practise resulted from changes in living conditions. It would appear that such a limitation was imposed when people were very conscious that a rise in population would endanger the welfare of all, a situation present in late 19th century Ireland, France, and perhaps other parts of Western Europe. Even with impressive images of whole communities starving because of uncontrolled fertility, people were probably more conscious of the dangers of overpopulation at the far more relevant 'region' of the household. On this social scale, standard of living is more important than possible early death, which is seen only as the most dire consequence of unregulated population growth. Families were chiefly concerned with quality of life for themselves and their children than the possible dangers to the community of overpopulation. In cultures where opportunities for asset accumulation were limited, it is possible that there was greater emphasis on judicious expenditure planning within marriage. The poor accumulation of assets at the beginning of marriage is probably linked with having a lower echelon job (a job other than artisan or merchant, for example), which in turn makes current income meagre. Further, as savings were generally not available, the family had to be very parsimonious in its spending habits. But more than anything else, a married couple had to pay close attention to their reproductive activities. The principle involved, unlike others concerning trade or finance, was actually so simple that even the most uneducated could understand it. Every child required more food, and in order to avoid economic strain, that child should work to feed himself or herself. A very young child is obviously incapable of self-care, but once a child reached an age where he or she could help in the family enterprise, then income (of whatever form) would increase, and another child could be added to the household. A clearly defined period of separation between births is of critical importance, with the goal of never having more mouths to feed than could be provided for. Thus, a woman marrying later, but having the same interval between births and the same age of final birth would have, indeed must have, a lower fertility than a woman marrying early. In this case, the cultural factor of timing, or birth spacing, is more important than exogenous economic forces. Although no doubt couples practised various means of controlling fertility in marriage, including periodic abstinence, coitus interruptus, and infrequently abortion and infanticide, the most clear and reliable method was through the adjustment of the age of marriage.
Marriage age is a regulatory mechanism or fertility 'governor' preventing overpopulation that results in lower standard of living and, more uncommonly, higher death rates. The governor's viability is based, however, on two premisses. One is that men and women in times of potential or real material distress delay marriage because they do not have the financial means to establish a household. The other is that couples do not take measures to accelerate or decelerate the pace of births; that is, the spacing of children within marriage is the same, regardless of marriage age. The first premiss is very common throughout history, the second is more problematic. It is assumed in the latter premiss that people do not use any other form of contraception except abstinence, and that given a certain natural fecundity, babies 'come when they will come'.
Thus, the idea that marriage age strongly governs fertility is weakened by the observation that the equal spacing rule is subject to many exceptions, where couples do not leave to chance the number of children they eventually will, but have a specific target in mind. This target is based upon the minimal quality of life a child should have, the amount of emotional gratification each child brings, and the amount of additional income of each additional child. There might have been reasons why couples did purposefully abstain from sexual intercourse in order to reduce the possibility of pregnancy. For example, sometimes a rise in child mortality was met with a decline in fertility not a gain, demonstrating a definite control of fertility within marriage. This was the case in the English village of Colyton where childlessness for women marrying below age 35 went from 8% to about 20% in the period from 1560-1629 to 1647-1770. (6) It is plausible that couples might not have wanted children in high mortality periods in order to avoid the almost inevitable heartbreak of losing a child, even if it meant being deprived of valuable labour on the farm. Emotion, not economics or fecundity, had in this case a key role to play in controlling fertility.
Other anomalies occur. There are instances where, for example, marriage is late, yet where fertility is also high. In areas where men and women have adequate work before marriage, they might be able to accumulate substantial savings, so that if they were to marry late, their financial position would allow for more children than if they married early. Thus, an early marrying couple would have 100 units of currency saved, and a late marrying couple might have 200 units. If each want to spend the same amount per child, then the late marrying couple would have more children than the early marrying one, if nature cooperated. However, this would only apply if the woman in question did not work or worked little in outside employment after marriage. This is indeed the pattern for industrialised societies, where it was not uncommon for females to work full-time before marriage, but unusual after marriage and certainly rare before the youngest child was under age 8 or 9. If parents had the intention of having more children if their finances improved (an eminently logical course), then later marriage in this type economy would facilitate having a larger family, thus the equation of later marriage = more children (higher fertility).
Even where money could not be saved we might see a violation of the regulatory theory, and late marriage did not necessarily entail lower fertility. The pre-Industrial economic situation was such that people sometimes saved money only with great difficulty, and the focus lay on what one earned at the present time and what one could obtain from inheritance and borrowing. Further, if it was the people's custom to set aside a certain fixed amount of money per child, then wherever there was no significant difference in the amount of wealth that couples would have at the beginning of marriage, whatever the age of marriage, then there would be no difference in the number of children one eventually had. If inheritance of net worth from parents or attaining a dowry was not a factor, then marrying late or early in this situation made little difference. Creating a good current income basis for a household was the only important issue, but this income could only cover present expenses and little would be left over for savings. The financial position of a man marrying at 22 could only be a little worse than one marrying at 28, since the latter could have not added that much to his finances. In this case, marrying later does not mean marrying wealthier. Hence, if the early marrying couple and the late marrying couple each had saved little or no money, and each planned to set aside the same amount of money for the raising and care of each child, then both couples would have the same number of children, if nature allowed them this. The fertility rate in either case would be roughly the same, as the financial position and the amount that could be spent on each child would be little different. We would therefore see no correlation of any kind between age of marriage and fertility.
Because of situations like the ones above, in more recent years the fertility governor or regulatory theory has come under attack as not being applicable anywhere except the well-documented and well-studied country of England. (7) It appears that the theory is generally applicable, but with notable exceptions. Apparent contradictions might be explained by one or more models, which incorporate specific economic and cultural factors.
The interaction of employment, savings, living standards, inheritance and availability of marriage partners varied from one region to another, often due to exogenous factors, such as specific economic conditions. However, even when the end results are different between regions, based on an examination of existing evidence, the reasoning processes that people used were essentially the same.
Let us look at an interesting set of early 19th century customs as they existed in Nanterre, a town near Paris. (8) Firstly, the area's very high rate of return from the land made it possible for even small plots to produce an adequate living. Secondly, the fact that some of the children in a family could settle into work outside of agriculture reduced the likelihood of inordinate population pressure on the land. Further, due to the nature and demands of the agriculture and wine growing, Nanterre did not ordinarily have resident servants who worked the land, but day labourers who worked whenever there was a need for outside assistance. Because of this practise, children originally helped out on the farm, and then after marriage, they left the household and wage labour was brought in. This economic situation, where men and women could 'freelance' as labourers and where farmers did not have to depend on a family for production, produced opportunities for independent living, and a fairly large number of households being occupied by single adults: bachelors, widows and widowers, with or without children. Nearly two-thirds of the households in Nanterre were nuclear, but some 23% were solitaires. Many unmarried men could live as boarders, and about 5% of the nuclear households had boarders living with them, usually because they produced significant income. These arrangements lessened the pressure to marry.
If people had a desire to marry, an extensive kinship system facilitated the securement of a marriage partner, because farmers lived in areas where neighbours were often relatives. People in this social climate evidently felt confidant enough in their future that it became common for parents and children to reach an agreement known formally as a demission de biens, where the parents would retire early, giving land to all their children in return for a life income. This freed the children to marry without having to wait for an inheritance. Further facilitating marriage for the children of farmers was the practise of giving some land to children upon their marriage and the practise of furnishing a significant father's dowry. Daughters could save money in anticipation of marriage by working as laundresses or seamstresses. Artisans, on the other hand, who came to Nanterre and thus had to take time to establish themselves, married later. They had fewer family members to draw upon for assistance, as can be seen in the fact that often they had friends, instead of relatives, witness their weddings. This social class also had fewer financial resources, and had less of a chance to provide a dowry or land.
Not surprisingly, farmers' marriages were both socially and geographically endogamous; most people wed those in the same trade or occupation as themselves or their fathers'. Whereas the marriage practises of Nanterre were not particularly common elsewhere, the desirability of marrying someone from the same background as onself reflected a very common theme. For example, socially prestigious farmers/wine growers' daughters tended to marry sons from the same trade, although there was a tendency for daughters to marry sons from other trades. The social situation did not remain static, and following changes in the economic structure, artisans grew in status and become numerous after 1820. Although other trades were generally endogamous and people preferred similarity, there was a 'pull' to marry into the largest and most lucrative occupations.
Exogenous factors freed people to make decisions about their adult life and marriage without having to worry about future obligations, family duty to work on a farm, or possible financial problems due to overly large families, early marriage or waiting for an inheritance, especially for younger sons.Therefore, economics to a significant extent determined the nature of family relations in at least this part of France.
In the south and the more remote areas of France, a very different culture applied, but one that was still based on exogenous variables. (9) To put it succinctly, as the economy weakened so did family relationships. Without overgeneralising, we can say that people essentially lived in a closed, rather suspicious world, where people erected successive barriers around themselves as a form of protection. Living in small villages, farmers and their families were distrustful and sometimes hostile to outsiders. Within the household, fathers held nearly total control, with wives in secondary position and children even further subordinated. Families rarely had cordial relations with one another, even though they frequently had to work with one another. Children were used as farm labourers, and if a child worked somewhere else, he would be expected to give over his earnings to his family. We also see that respect for traditional parental functions was declining, with schools taking over many child-rearing tasks, including the daily supervision and education of children. Men and women were warned to refrain as much as possible from giving money and land to their children, because this would only put parents at the mercy of their offspring. Although families were usually restrained in speech, parents often did not hide their dislike for their own children, and parents in turn were also derided and maltreated, especially in old age. Distrust between parents and children was matched by distrust between the sexes, beginning in childhood, and then continuing into adulthood, where males became indifferent to females, thinking them to be responsible for man's downfall. Many regions had high rates of celibacy, which might partly explain the denigration of women. By the end of the 19th century, fertility was dropping considerably, not only because of celibacy, but also because married couples were limiting fertility. How else could couples save themselves from the potentially disastrous fate of raising children, only to have them selfishly and spitefully abandon them in old age for better opportunities elsewhere?
'Need and greed' kept families together, not mutual desire, affection or moral compunction. Companionate relationships were indeed difficult to come by, and people spent more time using psychological devices to distance themselves from each another, than pulling themselves toward one another. A simple device could be utilised in many different situations: If one devalues what one really desires, then one can convince oneself that one does not want it that badly. The social situation in the southern French countryside, especially when distilled into the simplified form as seen above, is manifestly contradictory. Why would parents maltreat their children if they expected to depend on them in old age? Were they surprised when their own children treated them like animals when they were treated the same way? Why would families live together with animosity and rancour when they needed each other for support? The only rational answer would be that people no longer thought they were able to obtain what they wanted from the family and thus disparaged it. What we see is a case of a transient culture, where the insufficiency and despair of the 19th century created a crisis situation of mutual vindictiveness. The adage that the worst of times brings out the best in people is fanciful at best, and here we see good evidence of insuperable human frailty. When put into difficult circumstances, instead of becoming even more promotive of honour, devotion, and respect, people degenerate to pettiness, aloofness, and generalisations, in essence causing them and the family to self-destruct. Perhaps the meanness stemmed from the realisation that a culture and a way of life were about to pass into history.
Also, in times of peril, individuals, without training or prior experience, tend to over-control their personal situation. An attempt was made to achieve intermediate goals against the strong crosswinds of financial expediency, but instead of using subtle movements that allow the various forces to fall into an equilibrium, many used their options rashly and crudely, making attaining a steady course a hopeless undertaking. In such a challenging scenario, with the knowledge always in mind of the dangerous consequences that come from error, one desires clear results quickly, with any delay being disturbing. One could gain control of even very difficult situations by simply allowing the various mechanisms to 'settle down' after initiating some kind of action. Raising children and dealing with a family in difficult material circumstances is sure to provoke people to take harsh measures for rapid, certain results, but by doing so, they sow the seeds of enmity that will come back to haunt them.
Reasons for this kind of social turmoil and poor economic situation are not impossible to find. A major contributor to the problems that families faced might have been one component of the Code Napoléon (1794), which forced landowners to divide their property equally among heirs. This made it difficult for farmers to resist the temptation to limit births so that the land would not be split up, causing hardship for future generations and destroying family power. Where property ownership was common, birthrates indeed fell. However, as many peasants did not own the land they farmed, the laws concerning inheritance had limited applicability, although at the time this reason was commonly given or assumed. More relevant, and perhaps more troubling, a factor, which explains declining birthrates, was an economic environment where children no longer had the monetary and pragmatic value they once did. Here, contraception, continence and late marriage combined to restrain fertility.
Still, the most important reason for the indigence of the peasantry might have been high taxes and rents. They laboured and struggled to survive under onerous burdens over which they had little control. Our sympathy for the peasants is however tempered by the knowledge that their plight was to some significant extent self-imposed as well. Country people, although regarded as simple in tastes, would often sell their best agricultural products in order to buy items that might be considered as distinctly frivolous. (10) By the late 19th century, most people in France had many options as to where they could work, what kind of work they could do, what productivity measures they could implement, how and what they could sell, and what they could buy. Thus, as personal choice played a role in determining living conditions, so did it, at the very least, indirectly affect marriage timing, family size and family structure.
The south of France was not alone in its economic deprivation nor in its reaction to it. Analysis of conditions in contemporaneous Ireland, although very different in history and politics, demonstrates that the Spirit of the people described above, far from being characterised as merely 'French', could justifiably be called 'European'.
___________
1. Hajnal, 1965.
2. Alter, 1991. The main challenges revolve around the inability to explain why late marriage persisted so long in the cities when economic opportunities facilitating early marriage were present. Indeed, because of the strong economic growth and urbanisation throughout Europe, there should have been an overall lowering of marriage age in the 19th century.
3. Kuklo, 1991.
4. Kuklo, 1991. The figures were calculated after those of 'unknown' marital status were removed.
5. Wrigley, 1987, pp 281-283. In France, many men would marry women older than themselves as a way of limiting fertility, including middle-age widows (Weber, 1976, p 185). Aphorisms about this were contradictory, showing to a certain extent the ambiguity that surrounded the issue; popular sayings put in relief pragmatic concerns against the background of emotional needs.
6. Wrigley, 1987, p 257.
7. Spagnoli, 1983.
8. Segalen, 1991.
9. See Weber, 1976, pp 167-191.
10. Weber, 1976, pp 134-135
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright holder.
|